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Abstract—We present the results of the 2nd Annual 
Human-Agent League of the Automated Negotiating Agent 
Competition. Building on the success of the previous year’s 
results, a new challenge was issued that focused exploring the 
likeability-success tradeoff in negotiations.  By examining a 
series of repeated negotiations, actions may affect the 
relationship between automated negotiating agents and their 
human competitors over time. The results presented herein 
support a more complex view of human-agent negotiation and 
capture of integrative potential (win-win solutions). We show 
that, although likeability is generally seen as a tradeoff to 
winning, agents are able to remain well-liked while winning if 
integrative potential is not discovered in a given negotiation. 
The results indicate that the top-performing agent in this 
competition took advantage of this loophole by engaging in 
favor exchange across negotiations (cross-game logrolling). 
These exploratory results provide information about the 
effects of different submitted “black-box” agents  in human-
agent negotiation and provide a state-of-the-art benchmark 
for human-agent design. 
Keywords—human agent interaction; negotiation; 
empirical results in HCI 
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how humans negotiate has been a key 
question in business and psychological literatures for many 
years—it is a complex social task [7][16][17]. But as 
humans increasingly rely on automated agents to interact 
with the world around them, we must increasingly design 
agents that are capable of interacting with humans in these 
sorts of social tasks. However, negotiation involves a 
delicate balance between two entwined goals: success and 
likeability.  Succeed too much and too often, and 
negotiating partners will be hard to find or hostile. Bend 
over backwards to ensure likeability in negotiation, and one 
may find oneself on the losing end of too many deals. In 
this year’s Automated Negotiating Agent Competition 
(ANAC) [6], we explore these dual goals, and begin to 
disentangle their complicated relationship through high-
level analysis of a series of designer-submitted agents. 
1 Integrative potential refers generally to the ability for negotiators to 
“grow the pie” and increase the total points available to either party. One 
can measure the “amount of integrative potential discovered’ by looking 
While ANAC has been a recurrent, successful competition 
for 9 years (2019 has marked the 10th annual ANAC), it 
has been focused primarily on agent-agent negotiation. 
Human-agent negotiation is fundamentally different than 
agent-agent negotiation, and the Human-Agent Track of 
ANAC was added in 2017 to promote research into this 
promising area. 
But while the results of ANAC 2017 indicated that 
indeed, the initial agents were capable of rising to these 
challenges and negotiating on a reasonable level with 
humans, the negotiating space was fundamentally limited. 
Negotiations among humans are rarely single 
interactions—rather, interactions often recur, and the same 
negotiating partners will begin to be part of an ongoing 
negotiating relationship. This brings with it a new set of 
social problems for agents to tackle: rapport-building [14], 
favor-exchange [11], and reputation effects [19]. With 
these social problems in tow, negotiation with humans 
takes on new subtleties—one cannot pursue shortsighted 
strategies that damage relationships too early without 
paying the price in future interactions. 
In this work, we take an important step to widespread 
analysis of likeability and success, within the more realistic 
and far broader world of repeated negotiation. The Human-
Agent League for ANAC 2018 created a challenge to 
negotiate with humans over a series of three repeated 
negotiations. The competition received 10 submissions 
from a variety of worldwide organizations, and these agents 
employed a variety of strategies to succeed against humans. 
Agents were forced to consider the likeability-success 
tradeoff, and needed to find robust strategies that allowed 
them to succeed in a broader domain. 
In analysis of the competition data, we discover that the 
previously reported tradeoff between agent success and 
agent likeability [10] is more complex than at first assumed. 
Critical to negotiation, and to this important relationship, is 
the idea of “integrative potential”. While there exist many 
competing notions of integrative potential1, we look at 
at several metrics, including opposition metrics that relate to the Kalai-
Smorodinsky Solution, or to the Nash Product [2]. To parallel previous 
work on ANAC, we define this quantity as the “joint points”, or the total 
value of the agreed solution as discovered by the agent and the human. 
“joint points”, or the total amount of utility generated by 
the final agreement, when discussing this phenomenon. 
Specifically, in these results, we find that that when 
integrative potential is not discovered, agents remain 
likeable even when winning. We also present the strategy 
of the winning agent of the competition, which benefited 
from this observation by exchanging favors across games, 
thus maintaining distributive solutions within negotiations. 
II. COMPETITION DESIGN 
A. IAGO Negotiation Platform 
The IAGO Negotiation platform was proposed and 
designed by Mell et al. and was selected to be used for the 
Human-Agent League of ANAC [13] in 2017. Results from 
this first human-agent competition have been previously 
published [10]. IAGO provides a front-facing GUI for the 
human-participants (see Fig. 1). In particular, this feature 
allows subjects to be recruited using online platforms, such 
as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
Additionally, IAGO provides the features necessary for 
simulating the characteristics of human negotiation. These 
include an expanded set of channels for communication 
between both sides of negotiation, such as by sending text, 
expressing preferences, and transmitting emotions. Text is 
transmitted through a set of pre-selected utterances, and 
emotions are transmitted by selecting from a variety of 
prototypical “emojis” within the interface. These channels 
are in addition to the traditional methods supported by 
agent-agent negotiation platforms, such as exchanging 
offers. IAGO also allows offers to be sent that do not 
involve all the items in the negotiation (“partial offers”).  
These features of IAGO mean that it provides a 
platform to address the basic features that intelligent 
negotiating agents require. It provides information that 
allows for robust user modeling and allows multiple 
channels for communicating in different ways. IAGO 
provides information that agents require to reason about 
their own preferences and allows them to pursue a number 
of more complex strategies that require specific features 
(such as partial offers). 
 
Fig. 1. IAGO Research Platform (Client View) 
                                                          
2 Indeed, other topics considered for future competitions include the 
effectiveness of these human-like agents against their peer agents, mixed 
B. Human-Agent Competition Design 
1) General Information 
Much like the First Annual Competition, this second 
competition featured an array of participant-submitted 
agents competing against humans in multi-issue 
negotiation. However, in contrast to a single, 10-minute, 
multi-issue negotiation, participants engaged in three, 7-
minute multi-issue negotiations. While this by no means 
encapsulates the entirety of the human-agent negotiation 
space, it does allow us to narrow in on a set of questions 
about the dynamics of likeability and success over multiple 
negotiations, rather than in a single snapshot.2 
Participants were also asked a series of questions, 
ranging from demographic information to reviews of the 
agent behavior. Some of these questions were repeated, 
such that responses were received between the three 
negotiations (as well as at the beginning and end of the 
exercise). The submitted agents were judged according to 
the total number of points they earned, and prizes were 
awarded to the best agents. All agent designers submitted 
their own agents, which had to implement their own 
strategies with regards to opponent modeling, emotional 
understanding, and natural language response (see below). 
We were able to discern these strategies on a high-level, 
based on manual code inspection, process variable 
measurement, and designer-submitted descriptions. 
Results from the 2017 competition had indicated that 
there was a tradeoff between scoring well and being well-
liked—this competition was designed to craft a measure of 
score that took into account likeability. If such a tradeoff 
truly exists, then pursuing short-sighted strategies that 
increase points in the first negotiation but come at a severe 
cost to likeability may result in fewer points overall. 
Therefore, no prizes were considered for likeability alone, 
as agent score was thought to include the “useful” 
component of that measure. Likeability was still measured 
through self-report and was determined by user-submitted 
responses to Likert-scale questions after the end of each 
negotiation.  
Agent designers were provided with a set of guidelines 
that restricted the domain of the negotiation within 
moderate bounds, but they were not given the details of the 
task itself, which was determined secretly prior to agent 
submission. These guidelines stipulated that the total for 
each side would be the same if that side got every item. 
Furthermore, an additional restriction was added to the 
competition this year, such that each negotiation would 
have the same total utility (although the specific issues 
could change between negotiations). In this way, the agent 
designers were given some idea of the scope of the 
negotiation and would be confident that no single 
negotiation would decide the overall outcome. 
Designers were also provided with a limited set of 
natural language utterances that the humans could use in 
the negotiation. These utterances were preselected based on 
a modified set used in the previous year’s competition. 
They were communicated to the agent designers in 
advance, and human users were able to send them using a 
human-human/human-agent competitions, and partner choice. We 
welcome papers and future work that examine these topics. 
GUI button interface. This allowed designers to craft agents 
that could respond to human messages without having to 
design/implement NLP modules for their agents (which 
was not the focus of this year’s competition). Human 
players could also send pre-coded messages that contained 
information about their preferences, in addition to using the 
emotional and offer channels. Agents were unrestricted in 
the types of messages they could send back to players. 
Finally, agent developers were provided with the source 
code for a baseline agent (“Pinocchio”) which was 
provided with the IAGO platform.  
The competition’s three negotiations had 4 issues, with 
a varying amount of levels to each. The issues had 3, 2, 6, 
and 3 items, but this initial ordering varied for each of the 
negotiations (e.g., the second negotiation could have been 
6, 2, 3, 3). The task was partially integrative, with both 
sides gaining the most points by receiving the 6-item issue, 
but differing on their preferences for the two 3-item issues. 
Both sides also included a BATNA, which gave both 
players a minimum number of points should they fail to 
reach agreement. These three negotiations precisely 
mirrored the structure of ANAC 2017, in order to facilitate 
further scrutiny of the winning-likeability tradeoff. 
2) Participant Information 
Competition subject participants were selected from the 
MTurk subject pool. Subjects were adults and asserted that 
they were permanent residents of the US (verified with IP 
address). Restriction to the US was chosen in order to 
reduce cross-cultural variance. Each submitted competition 
agent was tested against ~25 participants. Participants were 
not re-used or matched against more than one agent. 
Subjects were asked a set of verification questions/attention 
checks to ensure they comprehended and were engaged in 
the negotiation. Additional participants were run to ensure 
n > 18 for each agent.3 
All participants were presented with a tutorial of the 
system before use. Participants were paid regardless of 
their success in the negotiation. However, they were also 
awarded “lottery tickets” based on their performance. 
These lottery tickets then entered them into a prize drawing 
for one of several $10 MTurk credits, incentivizing good 
performance during the negotiation. This design allowed 
the competition to follow best practices for subject 
recruitment and handling, in line with other research [1]. 
III. AGENT DESIGN 
As with human-human negotiation, there are many 
effective tactics that can lead to success in agent 
negotiation. These strategies have grown only more 
complex as work has examined repeated negotiations, 
where previous actions have impact on future interactions. 
This need to manage both human logic and human social 
perceptions of an agent led to agents that exploited 
numerous channels in their design.  
Among the agents that were submitted to this 
competition, for example, there are several that use emotion 
in an attempt to influence their opponent. This strategy 
(particularly the use of negative emotions to gain 
concession) has been well-documented both in human-
                                                           
3 Participants were roughly gender-balanced, and followed common 
demographic trends in MTurk users. 
human and human-agent contexts [18]. Agent Keni, for 
example, tried to adjust its strategy based on the number of 
human negative emotions received. Other agents attempted 
rapport with the human-participant through positive 
emotion, with the hope that it would lead to greater value. 
The top-rated likeability agent, Glinda, used this strategy.  
Within repeated negations, the idea of favor exchange 
(or “logrolling”) has been explored Since agents are 
evaluated on their ability to win over several games, losing 
a single game may be a viable strategy for building 
likeability and thus winning more in the long run. Indeed, 
Agent Equalist used this strategy to score the highest of any 
agent in the competition. 
All the agents also model their opponent to an extent, 
although agents do differ in how they accomplish this. The 
baseline agent (Agent Pinocchio) merely used information 
about preferences that had been explicitly given by the 
human user and then took a highly optimistic view of the 
remaining logical opponent models. Other agents, such as 
Quirinal, Keni, or Morty, all use some measure of the 
opponent’s offer history to create better opponent models.  
We provide brief accounts of the submitted agents 
below, and summarize their provenance in TABLE I. These 
accounts are based on designer-submitted descriptive 
documents, manual code examination, and examination of 
process variables and online testing. While we present 
these accounts in an attempt to outline the broad strokes of 
this year’s agent designs, our analysis remains somewhat 
“black-box”, and relies only on the process measures that 
are recorded within IAGO. 
1) Pinocchio (Baseline) 
The baseline agent was provided to all participants of the 
competition. Pinocchio followed a straightforward strategy 
that has been discussed in detail in previous work, as a part 
of the IAGO toolkit [12], but it follows a strategy most 
similar to the “Conceder” as described in [8]. Its behavior 
did not change over time, nor did it attempt to benefit from 
prior knowledge. 
TABLE I.  AGENT PROVENANCE 
Agent  Institution Authors 
Pinocchio 
(Baseline) 
Univ. of Southern 
California, USA 
J. Mell 
Athena Southwest University, China 
X. Li, Z. Dou, J. Li 
Cyh Tianjin University, China 
Y. Cui, J. Hao 
Equalist Bar Ilan University, Israel 
G. Yadgar, D. Juravski, N. Tshuva, 
C. Rozenshtein, K. Babay 
Glinda Bar Ilan University, Israel 
D. Nisim, N. Yakar, I. Nimni, N. 
David 
Keni Bar Ilan University, Israel 
I. Achituve, E. Orbach, K. Gilad, 
N. Shectman 
Morty Southwest University, China 
L. Yuan, S. Chen 
Quirinal Bar Ilan University, Israel 
P. Roit, A. Zanbar, H. Besser, A. 
Maymon, A. Fux 
Smoc Bar Ilan University, Israel 
O. Drein 
Emma University of Strathclyde, UK 
S. Daronnat 
XDS Tianjin University, China 
D. Xie, J. Hao 
2) Athena 
Athena focuses on developing a dynamic natural 
language interaction with the human user, accounting for 
human emotions. In the face of aggressive human partners, 
Athena will refuse to concede, but with more passive 
partners, Athena will be cooperative. Athena also concedes 
more and “forgives” bad behavior in earlier rounds, in an 
attempt to teach its partner over time. This strategy mirrors 
on a high-level the “Tit-for-tat” agents in [8]. 
3) Equalist 
Equalist explicitly attempts to exchange favors across 
negotiations (cross-game logrolling). Specifically, it 
attempts to offer a very positive deal for the human in the 
first negotiation, in exchange for a very positive deal for it 
in the second negotiation. However, in the third 
negotiation, Equalist maintains a tough perspective, in 
order to pull ahead of its opponent.  Equalist therefore 
alternates between “Conceder” and “Hardheaded” agents, 
per the terminology in [8]. 
4) Glinda 
Glinda is based primarily off of “Elphaba”, an agent 
submitted to ANAC 2018. However, Glinda focuses 
entirely on trying to improve likeability through 
friendliness, and is a “Conceder” agent. 
5) Keni 
Keni bases its opponent model on both preference 
statements by the user as well the frequency of issues 
within offers. Keni attempts to take issues that it believes 
to be of little worth to the player, and attempts to change its 
natural language statements based on expressed emotion.  
It is conciliatory, and best fits the “Conceder” description. 
6) Morty 
Morty attempts to glean a behavioral model of its 
partner by examining the issues the partner used in his 
offers. Furthermore, Morty attempts to “stall” the first 
negotiation in order to gain more information. In later 
negotiations, it adjusts its concession rate based on this first 
negotiation, thus fitting the “Tit-for-tat” approach. 
7) Quirinal 
Quirinal incorporates human offers as well as human 
preference statements to try to determine an accurate 
ordering of issues for its opponent. Quirinal also generally 
tries to find mutually beneficial deals, but will occasionally 
explore the space with non-optimal deals. Quirinal’s 
margin for acceptance widens as the negotiation goes on, 
and is a “Conceder” agent. 
8) Emma 
Emma takes a two-phase approach to negotiation. In the 
first half of a negotiation, Emma provides counter-offers 
based on the total number of items offered (regardless of 
their actual value). In the second half, Emma instead 
focuses on the value of items. Since exact utilities of 
opponent items are often unknown early on, this may be a 
helpful approach. This strategy varies from others, and may 
fall into the “Random” agent category, per [8]. 
9) XDS 
The XDS agent seeks out integrative potential in all 
rounds and tries to come to a “win-win” solution. XDS also 
purports to be affected by human emotion and tries to 
account for human lying. XDS is a “Conceder”. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Method 
For the purposes of the competition, all agents’ scores 
were compared one-to-one. Dunnett’s 2-sided test 
confirmed any significant differences for one-way 
contrasts against the baseline agent, Pinocchio. Significant 
differences between submitted agents were determined 
with post-hoc analysis, using Bonferroni correction. 
Likeability was determined by a series of self-reported 7-
point Likert questions after negotiation: 
• How satisfied were you with the final agreement? 
• How much do you like your opponent? 
• Would you negotiate with this opponent again? 
Likeability was previously used in the ANAC 2017 
results and found to have high reliability. 
B. Likeability 
Likeability varied substantially across the submitted 
agents. We examined the total likability by summing the 
three individual likeability scores for each negotiation. 
Quirinal had the lowest overall likeability (mean of 12.2 
points) while Glinda had the highest overall (mean of 17.7 
points). The average was 14.4 points. Pinocchio, the 
baseline agent, had a likeability of 15.8 points. The mean 
likeability scores for each agent are shown in Fig. 3.  
C. Agent Score 
Agent score took into account the total agent points 
summed over all three negotiations. It considered agents 
points earned only (and did not consider the human score). 
However, Equalist was the top-scoring agent both under 
that methodology and by examining “point lead” (human 
score subtracted from agent score). Equalist scored 89.72 
points on average, putting it well-above the baseline agent 
Pinocchio (which scored 72.82) and the average score 
(mean 76.96). The lowest scoring agent was Emma, with 
an average of 68.35 points. These scores can be seen in Fig. 
4. Equalist was significantly higher than its closest 
competitor (XDS), under Bonferroni correction (p < 0.05). 
We also break out the individual results in Fig. 5. In 
general, the average scores for each negotiation across all 
agents were similar: negotiation 1 mean was 24.8, 
negotiation 2 mean was 26.7, negotiation 3 mean was 25.9. 
However, among individual agents, there were significant 
differences. Emma saw a large drop in performance 
between N1 and N2 (25.4 to 20.5) while Equalist showed a 
staggering increase (24.5 to 36.1).  
D. Cross-Game Logrolling 
Due to the large differences between agent score across 
games in certain agents, we decided to examine the 
differences as a structural feature of the interaction. We 
examine the maximum point spread between negotiations 
and performed regression analysis to examine correlations 
to “winning” (as measured by the agent point lead). We 
found a significant, positive correlations such that agents 
that have larger differences between their scores in 
different negotiations tend to score better overall (t = 3.211, 
N=240, p = 0.002). This effect is largely driven by the 
Equalist agent, which had a strategy that was designed to 
maximize these differences by exchanging favors and 
“logrolling” across multiple negotiations. 
E. Winning and Likeability 
Previous work has indicated that there is a tradeoff 
between winning and likeability. This effect is not 
surprising from a human perspective; losing is generally 
not pleasant and may negatively influence perceptions of a 
partner. Furthermore, negative perceptions may lead to 
tougher bargaining in the future (“tit for tat” strategies). 
However, since repeated negotiations by necessity require 
balancing winning across multiple interactions in order to 
maximize payout, we examined this relationship in detail. 
We performed regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between “winning” (as measured by the point 
lead) and likeability. We found a highly significant effect 
such that increased point leads led to reduced overall 
likeability (t = -2.692, N=240, p < 0.01). Since increased 
points are tied to discovery of “integrative potential” within 
games (or “win-win” scenarios), we also examined the 
effects of joint points discovered. We likewise found a 
significant, positive correlation between liking the agent 
and discovering joint points (t = 4.016, N=240, p < 0.001). 
Entering all three of these variables into a regression 
analysis found that both main effects held, and there was an 
interaction between joint points and likeability such that in 
negotiations where joint value was discovered, winning 
was correlated with lower likeability, but where joint value 
was not discovered, winning was correlated with higher 
likeability (see Fig. 2).  The main effect of liking on point 
lead controlling for joint points was still negative and 
significant (t = -2.110, N=240, p = 0.036).  Similarly, we 
found the main effect of joint points on point lead 
controlling for likeability was also negative and significant 
(t = -2.513, N=250, p = 0.013).  Finally, the interaction term 
was significant (t = -2.385, N=240, p = 0.018). 
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this competition confirm the complexity 
of strategic tradeoffs in repeated negotiations. We isolate 
agent likeability (as reported by their human partners) as 
being particularly significant in understanding human-
agent outcomes over time. Admittedly, these exploratory 
 
Fig. 2. Winning-Likeability Tradeoff, Interaction with Joint Points 
results do not put to rest questions over the causal 
relationship between likeability and scoring well (i.e., is not 
being well-liked an indicator that you are winning, or does 
winning cause unhappiness and a lack of likability?). Such 
is the cost of competition-based analyses, wherein the exact 
strategies of the submitted agents must needs remain 
somewhat “black-box”. But these results do indicate that 
there is a tradeoff, and that the tradeoff is also dependent 
on the joint points earned by both parties. Since all of the 
negotiations in this study were at least partly integrative, 
we can look at joint points as a proxy for integrative 
potential discovered. 
Per Fig. 2, we can acknowledge several expected 
results: when integrative potential is discovered (high joint 
points), agents are well-liked when they have a small lead, 
and not well-liked when they are far ahead. But, unusually, 
when the outcome is distributive (there are low joint 
points), there is no correlation between winning and 
likeability. There are several potential explanations for this 
effect that warrant further follow-up beyond these early 
speculations. First, it is possible that people who fail to 
discover integrative potential are simply less aware that 
they are losing and are therefore less likely to blame their 
partner via a dip in likability. Alternatively, it may be that 
people are simply less concerned with fairness when 
integrative potential has not been grown. In short, people 
are more likely to be angered if the partners “grow the pie” 
but then the pie is stolen, than if the pie fails to grow at 
all—they are more accepting of a lopsided/unfair solution 
in this case. There has been some prior work that indicates 
this latter view may hold some merit [15]. 
Still, this result seems to create an unfortunate strategic 
catch-22: since discovering integrative potential tends to 
lead to more points, but claiming that value leads to low 
likeability, there may be no way to do well over time. 
However, the Equalist agent finds a loophole to this 
problem. By engaging in cross-game logrolling, Equalist 
manages to seek largely distributive but unfair solutions in 
each individual game. This doesn’t appear to come at a hit 
to likeability, and Equalist is able to exchange favors across 
games to ensure it still comes out ahead (particularly in 
Negotiation 2). Equalist does end up with more than its fair 
share, but this may be indicative of human behavior with 
regards to favors: they are able to exchange favors but have 
trouble keeping track of the exact magnitude owed. That 
way, Equalist does somewhat poorly in Negotiation 1 
(when it gives a favor) but does extremely well in 
Negotiation 2 (when the favor comes due). Previous work 
does indicate that people are perfectly capable of 
understanding reciprocity, but we posit that they may, in 
human-agent scenarios, fall back on heuristics that do not 
fully capture the complexities of favor exchange. Indeed, 
such subtleties are often the subject of advanced 
negotiation training courses. Of course, we emphasize that 
Equalist does not succeed against every user; systems and 
studies examining individual differences remain highly 
valuable. 
In general, these results further expand the picture of 
human-agent negotiating behavior, and provide more 
insight into the tradeoffs between winning and likeability. 
Several of the submitted agents include improvements to 
the state-of-the-art for human agent negotiation, and we 
hope to continue to push the boundaries of socially-aware 




Fig. 3. Total Likeability Score (Summed, three Negotiations, 7-Point Likert) 
 
Fig. 4. Total Agent Score (Summed three Negotiations) 
 
Fig. 5. All Agent Performance across All Three Negotiations Individually 
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